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RECENT decisions in states outside of the Southwest have
focused attention on the validity of beneficiary designations
contained in contracts issued after maturity of life insurance
policies, whether such contracts mature by the death of the in-
sured, by an election of the insured to surrender the policy, or
otherwise in accordance with policy provisions. Although the
question apparently has never been before the Texas courts, it is
a matter of great practical importance and worthy of considera-
tion.
A typical case arises when the insured under a life insurance
policy dies without having specified that the beneficiary is to
receive the proceeds under one of the optional methods of settle-
ment. Most policies provide under such circumstances that the
beneficiary may elect one of these settlement options, or possibly
a combination of options which will best meet his or her par-
ticular needs. Realizing that the person electing to receive periodic
payments under the settlement options may die before the entire
proceeds have been paid, the insurance company may permit the
payee to specify who is to receive unpaid proceeds after his or
her death, with the right reserved to change this designation. Quite
often a provision may be included permitting the payee to with.
draw the unpaid proceeds at any time due to changed circum-
stances. This typical arrangement seems altogether proper from
the standpoint of the payee, who will receive a guaranteed income,
with the right to change the arrangement if necessary, reserving
also the right to dispose of unpaid proceeds as simply and easily
as did the insured originally. From the standpoint of the insur-
ance company the arrangement is satisfactory, for the better life
insurance can fulfill human needs, the more desirable it will be.
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To the insurer it is simply a matter of marketing the best pos-
sible product.
But now the assertion must be reckoned with that this arrange-
ment is a testamentary disposition and therefore invalid. The
attack is made because the payee under the contract issued after
maturity of the insurance policy reserves the right to change the
beneficiary who will finally receive any unpaid proceeds. The
attackers argue that since the designation becomes effective only
when death has removed the possibility of a change, the designa-
tion is of no legal significance until death and is therefore testa-
mentary. Even if the right to change the designation is not re-
served, the theory then becomes that reservation of a right of
withdrawal by the payee provides the same effective control over
the proceeds until death.
At this point it is appropriate to point out that these ques-
tions may arise in three instances. The person making the election
may be (1) the beneficiary in a life insurance policy which has
matured by the death of the insured, (2) the insured under an
endowment policy which has matured according to its terms, or
(3) the insured who has surrendered a policy and elected to have
the cash surrender value paid under one of the settlement options.
The same principles would seem to apply in all three situations.
Before analyzing the problem further, it may be helpful to
consider two recent decisions on the question. On January 7, 1952,
a New York supreme court handed down its decision in Hall v.
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.' This was an inter-
pleader case, the issue being whether the contingent payee
named by the payee in a supplementary contract (the beneficiary
in the life insurance policy) issued after the death of the insured
should be permitted to receive the unpaid proceeds after the death
of the payee, or whether the attempted designation by the payee
was a testamentary disposition and therefore invalid. The execu-
tors of the deceased payee claimed the proceeds, contending that
1 109 N. Y. S. 2d 646 (1952). The cale has been appealed.
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the supplementary contract, insofar as it sought to direct payment
of the proceeds to a contingent payee, was an attempted testa-
mentary disposition and therefore void as a violation of the
Statute of Wills. This contention was based on the theory that the
supplementary contract was not an insurance contract but a new
and independent contract because of certain variations between
the basic policy provisions and the income settlement agreement
ultimately issued to the beneficiary-payee. These differences were
that the payee was to receive interest on the unpaid proceeds
quarterly, where the policy provided only for annual interest pay-
ments, and that the payee was to be permitted to withdraw the
proceeds, while no withdrawal provision was included in the basic
policy of insurance.
The trial court (supreme court) held that the policy, as a con-
tract of insurance, terminated with the death of the insured and
that all that remained was the obligation to pay the proceeds. Since
the insurance was no longer in force, the court reasoned that the
income settlement agreement was not a contract of insurance or
a supplementary contract. By holding that there was no supple-
mentary insurance contract, application of rules generally recog-
nized as controlling because of the sui generis nature of life insur-
nce policies and supplementary contracts providing for payment
of insurance proceeds was prohibited.' Thus, the executors of the
deceased payee recovered the unpaid proceeds because the payee's
direction to the insurer was testamentary and a violation of the
Statute of Wills. The court sought to support its holding primarily
because the deferred payment agreement issued to the deceased
payee was not in accordance with the guaranteed provisions of the
basic policy, including certain provisions requested by the payee
and permitted by the insurer as an additional service to the payee.
Since the decision was rendered, an addition to Section 24-A
of the New York Personal Property Law has been enacted to make
2 Gurnett v. Mutual Life, 356 fI1. 612, 191 N. E. 250 (1934) ; In re Brotherhood of




it clear that where the insured has not specified who shall be con-
tingent payee, the beneficiary named in the policy can designate
who should receive unpaid proceeds, and that such action shall
not be questioned as possibly being a testamentary disposition and
subject to the Statute of Wills. Although this declaration of legis-
lative intent may have considerable weight when the case is heard
in the appellate division, it is not controlling, for the transaction
considered in the Hall case took place long before the passage of
this statute. The terminology of the statute and legislative note
at its end indicate that the Legislature did not intend to change
the pre-existing law, but sought only to avoid having the same
question arise in the future.
The most recent decision covering a similar situation was
handed down by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
on June 11, 1952, Toulouse v. New York Life Insurance Com.
pany.' In that case the executor of the insured's estate challenged
the validity of an agreement between the insurer and the insured.
The insured had exercised one of the optional methods of settle-
ment offered by an endowment policy upon its maturity, deciding
to leave the proceeds of the policy with the insurer, subject to
withdrawal on demand. Any amount in the insurer's possession
at the insured's death was to be distributed to designated third
parties.
The executor contended that the portion of the agreement desig-
nating third parties to receive the unpaid proceeds after the in-
sured's death was void as an attempted testamentary disposition
in violation of the Statute of Wills. The insurer took the position
that the agreement constituted a supplementary insurance contract
and was a valid third-party donee-beneficiary contract.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's holding that the
original insurance policy, the form letter or acceptance certificate
signed by the insured, and the supplementary contract constituted
the agreement between the insured and the company. In the major.
8 245 P. 2d 205.
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ity opinion Justice Hill pointed out that the right to take advan-
tage of optional methods of settlement provided in an insurance
contract is a valuable one and will be protected. The beneficiary
(or, as in the case under consideration, the insured) acquired
"a vested interest in the company's performance of that part of
its contract of insurance. Such an interest is in the nature of a
property right. The species of property is neither money nor real
property, but a contractual obligation."' The court then deter-
mined that to benefit from it a compliance with the Statute of
Wills was not necessary. The court pointed out that, while the
validity of such contracts as the one being considered had seldom
been passed upon, the validity of such provisions was assumed
without question in several cases.5
A reading of the several opinions in the Toulouse case estab-
lishes that three justices found the contract designating third
parties to receive the unpaid proceeds at the death of the insured
to be a supplementary contract, valid under sui generis principles
applicable to life insurance, and also that it was valid as a third-
party donee-beneficiary contract. Two justices concurred solely on
the latter ground, deciding that the insurer was the promisor, the
insured the promisee, and the designated payees were third-party
beneficiaries. The fact that the contract was conditional because
the promisee had a right to withdraw the proceeds at any time
did not render it invalid, since the rights of the donee-beneficiaries
were merely subject to that limitation. Four dissenting justices
chose to take a narrower view that the law of gifts must apply,
partly, it is submitted, because of a failure to understand the
actuarial significance of some language used in the insurance
policy.
Having posed the problem by a review of the contrary posi-
tions taken by these two recent cases, let us now consider the
'Id. at 208, citing Latterman v. Guardian Life Insurance Company, 280 N. Y. 102,
19 N. E. 2d 978 (1939), noted, 127 A. L R. 450 (1940).
6 Smith v. Smith, 172 F. 2d 399 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Aetna Life Insurance Company v.
Bartlett, 53 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mass. 1944).
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matter on the basis of fundamental principles and policy. To
eliminate some apparently extraneous matter, one can safely say
that if the person to receive the payment is named irrevocably
and there is no right of withdrawal, there is a present creation of
a right in the person. In those cases there seems to be no doubt
that the named third party has a vested right and is clearly a
third-party donee-beneficiary.' Likewise, it seems to be generally
agreed that if the insured elects an option exactly as guaranteed
by the insurance policy, or if the beneficiary makes such an elec-
tion when the policy matures by the death of the insured, a sup-
plementary insurance contract results and the sui generis prin-
ciples historically applied to the anomalous situations presented
by life insurance contracts are recognized.7 The problem which
has caused most discussion, however, arises when a supplementary
contract is issued after maturity or surrender of a policy and it
provides for payment to a beneficiary named by the person mak-
ing the election, which person also reserves the right to change
the beneficiary or withdraw all or a portion of the proceeds.
It is submitted that the most realistic approach to the problem is
to recognize that in any case the election to have the proceeds of
an insurance policy paid in a certain manner is not an isolated
act; it is always an integral part of one transaction, beginning
with the issuance of the insurance policy and terminating only after
the insurance company has paid the last dollar due under the
contract. In line with this view, it would seem proper to use a very
liberal interpretation in determining whether a contract is a sup-
plementary contract and therefore to be considered according to
sui generis insurance principles. One possible solution would be
to define a supplementary contract as one which is:
1. either a part of a life insurance policy or separate instrument,
6 Kansas City Life Insurance Company v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 182 S. W. 2d 624
(1944).
T Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127, 138 A. L. R. 1478
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 665 (1942).
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which may or may not be designated a trust agreement, referring to
the proceeds of a policy,
2. made between a life insurance company and the policyholder
or the beneficiary,
3. made before the maturity or surrender of the policy, or after the
policy has matured by reason of the death of the insured, or after it
has matured as an endowment, or upon surrender of the policy.
4. by which the company agrees to make definite future payments,
but which does not require the company to segregate or hold any par-
ticular fund for the payees,
5. such payments to be made to the person with whom the company
contracts, or to some other person, or both, as may be provided in the
contract,
6. in consideration of the payment of premiums to the company or
in consideration of the company's not making a payment presently due
under the terms of the policy."
Some such definition would provide a much more practical
method for deciding cases than the one used by the court in the
Hall case, where the contract was held not to be a supplementary
contract because of a variation in the provisions from guaranteed
rights under the terms of the insurance policy itself. Tested by
ordinary principles of common sense and fairness, it certainly
should not be determined that a designation of a contingent payee
is valid when the option selected is exactly as guaranteed, yet is
invalid if some liberalization is granted by the company to permit
it better to serve the insuring public. Indeed, it would seem most
unusual for a court to appear to censure the company for such
generosity and in effect punish the proposed recipient. Such a
view would prevent life insurance companies from extending to
policyowners and beneficiaries more liberal and flexible settle-
ment option privileges, although they are included in policies
currently being issued, without possibly invalidating the agree-
ment elected.9 The unusual result would be that a policyowner or
8 Cox, Berkeley, Corollary Legal Aspects of Supplementary Contracts in THE BENE-
FICIASY iN LIFE INSURANCE (David McCahan ed. 1948) 156.
9 For an excellent description of the social usefulness and sui generis nature of life
insurance policies and agreements concerning disposition of their proceeds see In re
Haedrich's Estate, 134 Misc. 741, 746, 748, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395, 402, 404 (1929), ayTd,
230 App. Div. 763, 243 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1930), affd, 256 N. Y. 608, 177 N. E. 160 (1931).
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beneficiary would have to be watchful lest the insurer grant
some privilege not guaranteed in the policy. Clearly such a situa-
tion is contrary to the public interest.
Another basis now frequently used by courts to uphold con-
tracts like that in the Hall case is that the payee is a third-party
donee-beneficiary. A trend in this direction probably exists, al-
though the writer has been unable to find any case offering a
sound reason why sui generis principles should not apply from
the time a life insurance policy is issued until all proceeds have
been paid.
A leading case"0 has held that failure to elect one option as
provided in the contract, while preventing the ensuing contract
from being a supplementary contract, did not invalidate the agree-
ment as being testamentary. The court reasoned that enforcement
of the agreement would not violate the Statute of Wills because
the beneficiary's right to enforce "is based upon a contractual
obligation and not on any interest in the property of the dece-
dent."" Since a withdrawal right was reserved to the beneficiary
under the insurance policy involved, the court held that the right
of the last taker specified in the agreement, "though subject to be
divested in the manner provided in the contract, is a vested right
arising when the contract is made and enforceable unless and
until terminated pursuant to the provisions of the instrument of
settlement."
'12
Further support for this theory is to be found in another lead-
ing case, Kansas City Life Insurance Company v. Rainey."B The
court in that case enforced a contract providing for payment of
remaining principal to a person designated in an "Investment
Annuity Policy" after the death of the owner of the policy who
had been receiving the income, despite the fact that the right to
10 Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127, 138 A. L. R. 1478
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 665 (1942).
11 Id. at 131.
12 Ibid.
13 353 Mo. 477, 182 S. W. 2d 624 (1944).
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change the beneficiary was reserved. Without determining whether
sui generis principles would apply as they do when a beneficiary
is designated by the insured in a life insurance policy, the court
held that so far as the person designated to receive the unpaid
proceeds was concerned, "any disposition as to her was effected
at the time she was designated as beneficiary. Her enjoyment of
the fund was merely postponed until Hall's death, subject to the
right of revocation retained by Hall."' 4
After these aspects of the problem have been reviewed, certain
conclusions can be drawn. First, by the weight of authority, from
the standpoint of carrying out the wishes of the policyowner, and
because of the great interest of the public in the validity of thou-
sands of such agreements now outstanding, the decision in the
Hall case is wrong.
Second, permitting agreements between the insured and in-
surer that are advantageous to the insured and acceptable to the
insurer, although not guaranteed in the insurance policy, should
be encouraged as a matter of public policy. When the policy has
matured by the death of the insured, the same privilege should
be extended to the beneficiary who elects an optional method of
settlement. As stated in the Rainey case, the "contract [was]
made and in force during Hall's lifetime. Hence there would be
no reason to surround it with formalities which safeguard a will.""'
Third, although contracts such as those discussed above can be
enforced as third-party donee-beneficiary contracts, it is submitted
that another valid basis perhaps equally good exists. Sui generis
principles long applied to permit designation of a beneficiary in a
life insurance policy, with a right to change reserved, should
apply also to income agreements issued as a direct result of the
maturity of a life insurance policy.'
IV. Dawson Sterling.
14 182 S. W. 2d at 626.
15 Ibid.; see Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578, 14 L. R. A. 860 (1891).
16 See authorities cited supra note 2.
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